鬥雞與生存危機 - Sisyphus (Nom de Plume)

Games of Chicken and Existential Risks: A Hot War in Europe – The Former and the Next Lives of the On-Going Russo-Ukrainian War 2022

The red flags had been right in front of our noses – history and the recent records of Russian military intervention portended the looming risks of war and another nuclear crisis. This game of chicken may be more dangerous than before, happening in an era with mature nuclear missile technologies right under the wrong hands.

The 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine is one of the largest conventional wars in Europe after WWII. The Cold Peace since the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991-2022), as identified by some scholars, is by now broken. By definition, a Cold Peace is in contrast to the Cold War, when there are “constant covert conflicts” that “repeatedly threatened to erupt into overt (nuclear) warfare.” A well-known Cold War example would be the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet the world is facing a problem arguably more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Cuba played a bigger role than the Soviet Union through proactively negotiating a deal for the Soviet Union to transport missiles covertly to the tiny island next to the United States. In contrast, we now have Putin holding the world hostage with his “special [nuclear] alert,” while Russia stages a full-scale direct invasion of Ukraine, which has been seen as an important part of the rightful territory of the Russian Empire. If we are to frame and understand this situation through the lens and vocabularies of the World System Theory of the prominent International Relations scholar Immanuel Wallerstein, the Ukrainian territories are not at the periphery but a lot more proximate to Russia. Is this new? Ironically, there has been an abundance of post-WWII regional wars that pitted the United States against the Soviet Union, including but not limited to the Korean War (1950-53), the Vietnam War (1955-75), and the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-89), and such a risk has always existed. So in a nutshell, were these regional and proxy wars also potential nuclear threats? Yes, and humanity has been walking on the edges of the existential risk of survival. Yet even in this period of the so-called Cold Peace (1991-2022), relations between Russia, as a USSR succession state, with the freshly independent post-Soviet states, were unstable.

This article will discuss how the risk of a full-scale war has been repeatedly foreshadowed by recurring conflicts and small-scale wars in the region around and after the turn of the millennium, including the Transnistria War (1990-2), the Russian-Georgian War (2008), Crimean Crisis in Ukraine (2014). The risk of war had always existed. When we look at the wars and military operations Putin staged after his ascension to power in the last three decades, there have been numerous red flags. As the lyrics of the Billy Joel famous song goes – “We Didn’t Start the Fire,” the world “was always burning, since [it has] been turning.”

I . The World Was Always Burning : Former Lives of the On-going Russo-Ukrainian War

Russia has records of military intervention regarding neighbouring former Soviet Union states and this military trend has intensified around the 2010s under Putin. Yet, the Transnistria War that happened before Putin became the president of Russia seemed to have foreshadowed rising military tensions in the region during the early 21st century.

1.Before Putin : Russian’s Political Tradition of Honour, Assertiveness, and Expansion

Russia has a political tradition that perceives the conquering of land to be an honour of rulers, which can be traced to Ivan III, who named himself as the “Grand Duke of Russia,” formulated the “gathering of Russian lands” policy, and warred against the Novgorod Republic in Russia, the Poles, and the Mongols for control over Russian Orthodox Church subjects at his time. Asserting the great power status of Russia has been an important agenda and convention of political leaders of the country. Although Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost (Transparency) and perestroika (Reform) brought liberal changes to the Russian political structure, the “rapid development of civil society and formation of so-called informal associations also played a role in increasing ethnic tensions” in various former Soviet states today. This included former Soviet states from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, to Ukraine. The weakened position of Gorbachev’s regime to assert the notion of unity for the Soviet Union ultimately “led to the the collapse of the Soviet Union.” He was “ultimately forced to resign in 1991.”

Side Notes – Territories of the Imagined Russian Empire

For the purpose of contextualisation, this essay would like to note that the imagined territory of Russia is often associated with the former territories of the Soviet Union (Fig. 1). Yet the Soviet Union’s expansionism was also influenced by Russian tsars prior to the 20th century, as shown in the map of Russian Expansion in Asia (Fig. 2), which had significant overlaps and similar shape of borders with the map of the Soviet Union.

Fig. 1. Encyclopædia Britannica, Soviet Union, 1917/22–1991.

Fig. 2. *Encyclopædia Britannica,* Russia Empire, 1533-1894.

2.Also Before Putin : The Transnistria War (1992)

After Moldova gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1990 and declared Moldovan to be their official language instead of Russian, Transnistria broke away from Moldova in 1992, and has become a de facto state with an absence of international recognition.

In 1992, a war broke out between the Moldovan and Transnistrian separatist forces. And one of the most important factors leading to the independence of Transnistria was the militant support they received from Russia, including deploying the Russian Fourteenth Army which helped “secured the victory in [this war,]” as well as equipping and training Transnistria’s military forces To this day, there are Russian troops stationed in the region, which is sandwiched by Moldova and South-west Ukraine that is currently not at the battle frontier of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

3.The Russian-Georgian War (2008)

After his inauguration, as a former intelligence agent of the Soviet Union, Putin has not hesitated to adopt military means at the international level to achieve his agendas.

In 2008, NATO declared that Georgia and Ukraine would join them one day and a few months later, we witnessed the invasion of Georgia by an infuriated Putin. This time, two Georgian states South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both located between the borderlands of Russia and Georgia, declared independence with Russian support. Yet without the security guarantee of NATO, Georgia lost to Russia in merely 5 days. Following the victories, Russia has maintained a military presence in both regions, and this was how Putin first tasted the fruits of victory, gaining back former Soviet Union territory.

In the same year, Ukraine and Georgia were both declared to be included in the NATO Membership Action Plan.

4.2014 Crimean Crisis : Revolution of Dignity, Annexation of Crimea, and the War of Donbas that Followed

In the Russian expansionist perspective, Ukraine has been the rightful territory of Russia, and is a region that is “Russian.” It had become clear that following Georgia, Ukraine would be the obvious next target of Russian expansionism.

Side Note – the Ukrainian Identity

To counter the Russian narrative and justify their legitimacy of independence, Ukrainians need to assert their cultural identities. Instead of having a political culture that is centred around the idea of statehood, Ukraine was ruled by many external powers including the Poles, Austrians, the Ottomans, prior to being ruled by the Russian Tsar and Communists. In short, under these circumstances and the 1917-21 War for Independence that resulted in the establishment of a Ukrainian republic for the first time, whilst Ukrainians defended their territorial independence against the Soviet Union until the 1950s. In 1991, Ukraine became independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, some regions, such as Transnistria, with a heavy concentration of Russian-speaking population, tend to consume Russian media and identify with Russia more.

Pretext and Developments of the 2014 Crimean Crisis

The 2014 Crimean Crisis followed the footsteps of Georgia, eventually leading to the annexation of Crimea, although this process involved a mixture of military and referendum means.

The former pro-Russia president Yanukovych did not sign the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement, and was ousted from Ukraine as a result. Protesting against his action, the 2013 Euromaidan Movement in Ukraine, which emphasised Ukraine’s identity as a European rather than Russian nation, escalated to the Maidan Revolution (also known as the Revolution of Dignity) in 2014.

In reaction to the revolution, on 27 February 2014, pro-Russian activists with face coverings occupied the Crimean Supreme Council, and a referendum regarding the status of Crimea was held in mid-March in the same year. Crimea declared a result of favouring being returned to Russia. However, later leakage of document showed that the actual turnout was 30 percent instead of 83 percent, while only half voted for uniting with Russia. Just a year later, Putin showed his true colours and admitted having orchestrated “the work to bring Crimea back into Russia,” despite his original denial.

Yet, the Crimean Crisis was just a start. After Crimea was absorbed into Russia, pro-Russian separatists in Donbas seized and declared Luhansk and Donetsk to be independent, leading to a series of conflicts in the region despite peace-keeping efforts in recent years.

5.War of Donbas (2014-21) and Repeated Violations of Peace Agreements, and the Escalation to a Full-Scale War (2022)

It is important to note that the War of Donbas has been on-going since the Annexation of Crimea in 2014 despite ceasefire agreements.

The Minsk Agreement was signed for the first time in 2014. Yet this peace was temporary, and was broken in January 2015, when the separatists (backed by Russia) in both Luhansk and Donetsk embarked on military attempts to seize territories lost to the Ukrainian government in 2014. This time, efforts were exerted to bring back peace again by the signing of the Minsk II Agreement, with the French president and German Chancellor liaising with both Ukraine and Russian presidents. Again, this second peace agreement was broken, with the number of violations up to “one million” during 2015-18; While Russia has simplified the procedures of granting citizenship to residents of both self-declared independent regions.

In November 2021, satellite images showed Russian military forces increasing presence at Ukrainian borders, and yet again Putin denied any military plans. However, within five months, he has declared a full-scale war to Ukraine on February 24 this year, bombing civilians and displacing more than 11 million Ukrainian refugees. Since April 17, the second phase of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine has begun with another escalation of war in Donbas, after the siege of Mariupol.

Side Notes – Donbas as a Region

Donbas is a distinct region from the Crimea Peninsula. Situated inland, Donbas has been the centre of coal-mining industry, steel production, with a culture of corruption left by the mafia families there, and hence some argued that Ukraine might be better off without the political influence of Donbas. In terms of political culture, there was little “overseeing state authority [in Donbas] until the very late tsarist era,” with a tendency to “acquiesce to power exercised from outside if sufficiently strong” forged by a “winner takes all” mentality.

Yet militarily, given the relatively small scale of the Ukrainian navy which was mainly located in Sevastopol in the Crimea Peninsula, Ukraine did not have an effective navy after the year of 2014 when Crimea was annexed. Hence in 2022, it is not realistic to try to take back Crimea after the 2014 Annexation, in comparison to defending Ukraine in the region of Donbas against the puppet republics installed by Russia.

II. Next Lives and Rippling Effects of the On-going Russo-Ukrainian War : Where is this Chicken Game between Russia and NATO going ?

1.Concept of the Game of Chicken

As described by Bertrand Russell in his classic work Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare (First Published in 1959), the Game of Chicken is:

“This sport is called ‘Chicken!’ It is played by choosing a long straight road with a white line down the middle and starting two very fast cars towards each other from opposite ends. Each car is expected to keep the wheels of one side on the white line. As they approach each other, mutual destruction becomes more and more imminent. If one of them swerves from the white line before the other, the other, as he passes, shouts ‘Chicken!’, and the one who has swerved becomes an object of contempt.”

This game, as described by Russell, was played by irresponsible boys but when statesmen do so, they are considered to be performing strategic acts of courage, which is “absurd.” His prediction was the following:

“The game may be played without misfortune a few times, but sooner or later it will come to be felt that loss of face is more dreadful than nuclear annihilation. The moment will come when neither side can face the derisive cry of ‘Chicken!’ from the other side. When that moment is come, the statesmen of both sides will plunge the world into destruction.”

If Russell still lives in our era, he may warn us that we are in an increasingly dangerous game of chicken, which could be triggered by strategic advances essential to both NATO and Russia, since we are back to a game between two major nuclear powers – the US and Russia. This is not to say that other countries are not capable of starting a nuclear war : Every nuclear country that has an inclination or pattern of aggressive behaviour should be closely monitored because they are capable of posing existential threats to the entire humanity. However, we have a lot more existing nuclear weapons today as compared to 60 years ago when the Cuban missile crisis happened in 1962.

According to the definition and predictions of what Russell had put forward at the early stage of development of nuclear technology, as long as both sides have rationales that compelled them not to back down, the end game will be mutual destruction.

2.Through the lens of the Game of Chicken: Between Brinkmanship and Surrender

Rationally speaking, there should be no country that desires the worst outcome of the chicken game – mutual destruction. However, for both countries to swerve in the chicken game is also not an option given that both can improve their outcome obtained from the chicken game. In other words, for the two players in the game to obtain a balance, one side must swerve. This is because for the party who swerved, there is no better outcome as well because if they do not – the outcome is destruction. And for the party that did not swerve, of course they have achieved their agenda. The winning strategy would be to convince the other party that one is irrational – one won’t swerve.

3.Russia’s Response to NATO’s Expansion (1999-Present) and the International Relations Theory of Realism

The current situation regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine confirms the realist claim that a country perceives the move of neighbouring nations, such as the formulation of military alliances, as threat. According to the rule of survival of the fittest and strongest, the country perceiving threat may react with enhancement of its own power and military capacity.

The latter is Russia, as presented in the speech of Putin in his declaration of war against Ukraine arguing that NATO has taken too many steps and intervention in the region that now it is time to retaliate, if we take the literal meaning of his speech. Of course there are reasons for Putin or any Russian leadership to react, after the inclusion of more post-Soviet states into NATO since 1999, partly due to a lack of Russian alliance countries in Europe that will balance American influence. Until now, the remaining post-Soviet countries in Europe sandwiched between NATO and Russia includes Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, and Moldova, which are in or close to the conflict zone that critics fear the war will extend there. After all, the old Soviet Union or Russian Empire wasn’t confined to Ukraine and Georgia beyond the current Russian borders. Whether Russian military moves in the recent year is solely propelled by NATO’s expansion is questionable, and the imperialist motives behind also must be examined.

Hence, under realist influence and mode of thought that Russia should become great again, another game of chicken has been initiated proactively by Putin with his repeated warnings of his nuclear weapons in the spring of 2022, starting another war that has resulted in the largest scale of displacement and casualties in Europe after the turn of the millennium. Labelled a war criminal and having his sanity questioned, Putin adheres to the nuclear game of chicken’s strategy that one should be able to convince others that they would not swerve.

In an ideal world depicted by Russell, if leaders are rational and they recognise a common interest in survival of the human race, they should escape from the arm race. However, the world is absurd. After Putin proudly announced that the Russian Satan II nuclear missile could strike the US, Washington is now in a heated debate and some are eager to raise military budget to advance nuclear technology such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N).

The world may have come a full circle to an arm race again if this continues, however, it is also not a viable option to be terrorised by nuclear bombs under dictatorship. With this, we will witness another full regression of humankind from democracy to the rule by the strongest. Yet, power’s nature is coercion and violence, and some episodes of history, unfortunately, cannot escape that.

4.What the Future May Hold

Looking into the future, critics have put forward several possibilities how this war may end: Short War, Long War, European War, Diplomatic Solution, and the Ousting of Putin. However, though grim and pessimistic, this article believes that there is also a possibility for nuclear disaster when a dictator with the nuclear button was to be cornered. In contrast to 1962, this game was not initiated by a third country but Russia itself, and is more dangerous than half a decade ago.

Footnote

1.The writing of this article commenced in mid-April. Amid the writing process, Putin warned the world of his latest missile “Satan II” on 21 Apr 2022. See, Nick Allen, Jamie Johnson, and James Kilner, “Vladimir Putin Tests ‘Satan II’ – a Nuclear Missile with a Dozen Warheads That Can Hit ‘Anywhere in World,’” The Telegraph, April 20, 2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/04/20/vladimir-putin-tests-satan-ii-nuclear-missile-dozen-warheads/.

2.Detsch, Jack. “Pentagon Rolls Out Defense Strategy Amid War in Europe,” Foreign Policy, March 28, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/28/pentagon-defense-strategy-russia-ukraine-war/.

3. Engle, Eric. “A New Cold War? Cold Peace, Russia, Ukraine, and NATO.” Saint Louis University Law Journal 59, no. 1 (2014): 97-174.

4.Ibid, 99.

5.As a remark, both the Soviet Union and the United States had no full control of the situation in Cuba during 1962, whereas Castro and his inner circle were those who had transparency of information. Yet, the Soviet Union and the United States had struck a deal regarding the withdrawal of nuclear weapons in Turkey, for the Soviet Union to withdraw nuclear weapons from Cuba. As a note, the two superpowers did not involve Cuba in the negotiation, which was arguably the major benefitting party in playing up this conflict as I perceive, in comparison to the two superpowers. See, Fursenko, A. A., and Naftali, Timothy J. One Hell of a Gamble : Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964. 1st Norton Pbk ed. New York: Norton, 1998, Chapter 1.

6. “Ukraine invasion: Putin puts Russia’s nuclear forces on ‘special alert’,” BBC News, February 27, 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60547473.

7.Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World-System I. 1st ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.

8.This war only lasted for 5 days in comparison to the on-going Russo-Ukrainian War that had lasted longer than 2 months as of 19 April 2022 which this article was first drafted. See, Donovan Jr, George T. Russian Operational Art in the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. Army War Coll Carlisle Barracks Pa, 2009.

9.“We Didn’t Start the Fire,” Genius, October 17, 1989, https://genius.com/Billy-joel-we-didnt-start-the-fire-lyrics.

10.Tsygankov, Andrei P. Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 46-7.

11.Ibid, 5.

12.David R. Marples, “Review Article : Revisiting the Collaspe of the USSR,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 53, no. 2-4 (June 2011): 461–73, https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2011.11092684, 464.

13.The Soviets annexed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940, whilst these countries used to have better living standards than the rest of the USSR. This had become a point of discontent in these regions since then. As for Ukraine, there was a nationalistic revolution against being a part of Russia in 1917, and there was a “flowering of national cultures” during the 1920s. See, Ibid, 465.

14.Ibid.

15.Ibid.

16.Encyclopædia Britannica, Soviet Union (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica), accessed June 13, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/place/Soviet-Union#/media/1/614785/3893.

17.John C Dewdney and Martin McCauley, “Soviet Union | History, Leaders, Map, & Facts,” in Encyclopædia Britannica, December 20, 2018, https://www.britannica.com/place/Soviet-Union.

18.Encyclopædia Britannica, Russian Empire (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica), accessed June 13, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/place/Russian-Empire#/media/1/753050/3392.

19.As a note, the main language of Moldova has been Russian, and people watch Russian channels such as Russia 24. See, The New York Times, “How Russia’s Disinformation Spreads beyond Its Borders | Russia-Ukraine War,” www.youtube.com, April 12, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N04aLpZ0SJ8.

20.The Russian Fourteenth Army “secured Transnistria’s victory in the 1992 war with Moldova as well as helped to create, equip and train Transnistrian armed forces.” See, Marcin Kosienkowski, “The Patron–Client Relationship between Russia and Transnistria,” in De Facto States in Eurasia (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2021), https://wwww.repozytorium.kul.pl/handle/20.500.12153/1465, 12 ; Russia also sent special agents to aid Transnistria’s war with Moldova. See, Cloé Drieu and Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski, “Interview with Olga Capatina, – Physiotherapist and GRU Operative (Soviet-Afghan War) & Double Agent (Transnistrian War) -, Conducted in Paris, France, 25 September 2015 (EN),” The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies 20/21, no. Issue 20/21 (January 24, 2019), https://doi.org/10.4000/pipss.4564.

21.W. Alejandro Sanchez, “The ‘Frozen’ Southeast: How the Moldova-Transnistria Question Has Become a European Geo-Security Issue,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 22, no. 2 (May 29, 2009): 153–76, https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040902917917.

22.Romanova, Tatiana, and Maxine David. The Routledge Handbook of EU-Russia Relations. Milton: Taylor & Francis Group, 2022, 10.

23.Was It Inevitable? A Short History Of Russia’s War On Ukraine | Keith Gessen”, The Guardian, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/11/was-it-inevitable-a-short-history-of-russias-war-on-ukraine.

24.Gallis, Paul. “The NATO summit at Bucharest, 2008.” LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 2008 ; Vox, “Putin’s War on Ukraine, Explained,” www.youtube.com, March 3, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MVu8QbxafJE, 3:53.

25.Andrew Wilson, Ukraine Crisis : What It Means for the West (New Haven (Conn.) ; London: Yale University Press, Cop, 2014), 40.

26.Ibid.

27.Sebastian Muth, “Linguistic Landscapes on the Other Side of the Border: Signs, Language and the Construction of Cultural Identity in Transnistria,” International Journal of the Sociology of Language 2014, no. 227 (January 1, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1515/ijsl-2013-0086.

28.Some stated that the so-called Russian activists were Russian soldiers.

29.Kuzio, Taras and Paul D’Anieri, “The Causes and Consequences of Russia’s Actions towards Ukraine,” E-International Relations, 2018, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/06/16/the-causes-and-consequences-of-russias-actions-towards-ukraine/.

30.BBC, “Putin Reveals Secrets of Russia’s Crimea Takeover Plot,” BBC News, March 9, 2015, sec. Europe, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-31796226 ; NowThis World, “How Putin Annexed Crimea from Ukraine,” www.youtube.com, March 27, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vYDxOnDGpHc.

31.Kristian Åtland, “Destined for Deadlock? Russia, Ukraine, and the Unfulfilled Minsk Agreements,” Post-Soviet Affairs 36, no. 2 (January 27, 2020): 122–39, https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2020.1720443.

32. Kristian Åtland, “Destined for Deadlock?” 122.

33.Ibid, 123.

34.Vox, “Putin’s War on Ukraine, Explained.”

35.The Spectator, “Full Text: Putin’s Declaration of War on Ukraine | the Spectator,” www.spectator.co.uk, April 23, 2022, https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/full-text-putin-s-declaration-of-war-on-ukraine ; BBC News, “Ukraine’s Refugees: How Many Are There and Where Might They Go?,” BBC News, February 28, 2022, sec. World, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60555472.

36.Andrew Wilson, Ukraine Crisis : What It Means for the West, 123.

37.Silviya Nitsova, “Why the Difference? Donbas, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk after Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution,” Europe-Asia Studies 73, no. 10 (April 23, 2021): 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2021.1912297.

38.Regarding the fact that Ukraine did not have its own navy as of mid-March 2022. See, “Structure of Ukrainian Armed Forces,” www.mil.gov.ua (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, August 5, 2012), https://archive.ph/20120805142907/http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=structure&sub=navy ; J. Overton, “FOR UKRAINE, the 1,000-SHIP NAVY FINALLY SETS SAIL,” CIMSEC (Center for Marine Security, April 13, 2022), https://cimsec.org/for-ukraine-the-1000-ship-navy-finally-sets-sail/.

39.Tymur Korotkyi and Nataliia Hendel, “The Legal Status of the Donetsk and Luhansk ‘Peoples’ Republics,’” in The Use of Force against Ukraine and International Law (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2018), 145–70, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-222-4_7.

40.Bertrand Russell. Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare. Routledge Classics. Taylor and Francis, 2009. Foreword.

41.Bertrand Russell. Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, 15.

42.Robbert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66, no. 4 (July 2010): 77–83, https://doi.org/10.2968/066004008.

43.Bertrand Russell. Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, 16.

44.The York Management School, “Game Theory the Chicken Game,” www.youtube.com, accessed April 23, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ciSdRW-V0c.

45.Ibid.

46.The Spectator, “Full Text: Putin’s Declaration of War.”

47.Bertrand Russell. Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, 17.

48.Vic Mercado, “A Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile Will Help Deter Nuclear Aggression,” Defense News, August 5, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/08/05/a-nuclear-sea-launched-cruise-missile-will-help-deter-nuclear-aggression/.

49.James Landale, “Ukraine: How Might the War End? Five Scenarios,” BBC News, March 3, 2022, sec. Europe, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60602936.